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In The Visible Hand (1977) and subsequent works,1 Alfred Chandler focused
the spotlight on the large, vertically integrated corporation.

He did this not

merely to chronicle the rise of that institution but also to explain it and to give it a
prominent place in American economic growth during the last century and a half.
The force and originality of Chandler’s ideas coalesce in the book’s title, a
provocation in the direction of Adam Smith (1976).

Smith had predicted an

increasingly fine division of labor as the response to a growing extent of the
market; and, although he was actually quite vague on the organizational
consequences of the division of labor, Smith was clear in his insistence on the
power of the invisible hand of markets to coordinate economic activity.2
Chandler’s account appears to challenge this prediction: internal organization and
managerial authority became necessary to coordinate the industrial economy of
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The visible hand of managerial
coordination had replaced the invisible hand of the market.
On one reading, The Visible Hand is about the response of business
institutions to the conditions of a particular historical episode, namely the
dramatic increases in population and per capita income in the United States after

1

Notably Scale and Scope (1990).
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the Civil War, coupled with the equally dramatic fall in transportation and
transaction costs attendant on the railroad, the inland water network, and the
telegraph. On another reading, however, the managerial revolution represents the
emergence of an institutional structure inherently superior for all times and places
to that of decentralized ownership and market exchange in all its forms. History is
never kind to historicists, however; and the facts of the last quarter century have
made life uncomfortable for those who would project the Chandlerian model into
the present. It has become exceedingly clear that the late twentieth (and now early
twenty-first) centuries are witnessing a revolution at least as important as, but
quite different from, the one Chandler described.

Strikingly, the animating

principle of this new revolution is precisely an unmaking of Chandler’s revolution.
Rather than seeing the continued dominance of multi-unit firms in which
managerial control spans a large number of vertical stages, we are seeing a
dramatic

increase

in

vertical

specialization

—

a

thoroughgoing

“de-

verticalization” that is affecting the traditional Chandlerian industries as much as
the high-tech firms of the late twentieth century. In this respect, the visible hand
— understood as managerial coordination of multiple stages of production within
a corporate framework — is fading into a ghostly translucence.

2

In what follows, I will often appear to conform to the now rather outdated distinction
between markets and hierarchies, as that seems the best idiom in which to engage the issues as
Chandler raises them. Nonetheless, I hope that the narrative will convey, perhaps subtly, my belief
that “the market” encompasses a wide range of forms many of which are not anonymous spot
contracts but rather have “firm-like” characteristics of duration, trust, and the transfer of rich
information. For an extensive discussion of “network” forms of organization, see Langlois and
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We are left with the choice of abandoning Chandler or reinterpreting him.
This essay takes the latter course. If we take the first reading of The Visible Hand –
that the managerial revolution was an adaptation to particular historical
circumstances – then we can explain the organizational revolution of the new
economy by embedding Chandler’s story within a roomier account that admits of
a range of possible historical circumstances.

As a byproduct, such a

reinterpretation can hope not only to explain the new economy but also to shed
light on the organizational changes of the original Chandlerian revolution.
The basic argument — the vanishing-hand hypothesis — is as follows.
Driven by increases in population and income and by the reduction of
technological and legal barriers to trade, the Smithian process of the division of
labor always tends to lead to finer specialization of function and increased
coordination through markets, much as Allyn Young (1928) claimed long ago. But
the components of that process — technology, organization, and institutions —
change at different rates. The managerial revolution Chandler chronicles was the
result of such an imbalance, in this case between the coordination needs of highthroughput technologies and the abilities of contemporary markets and
contemporary institutions to meet those needs. It was an organizational solution
appropriate to its time and place. But with further growth in the extent of the
market and the evolution of institutions to support exchange, the central

Robertson (1995). See also Lamoreaux, Raff, and Temin (2002) for a discussion arguing that it is
valuable to distinguish these two classes.
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management of vertically integrated production stages is increasingly succumbing
to the forces of specialization.
Notice that this is not an argument that managerial coordination will
vanish entirely from the scene and that the large vertically integrated corporation
will follow the buggy whip and the vacuum tube into oblivion. Rather, it is an
argument that, in a population sense, large vertically integrated firms are
becoming less significant and are joining a richer mix of organizational forms.
Many commentators on Chandler have long insisted on the importance of small
firms and flexible production in economic growth, even during the managerial
revolution (Atack 1986, Supple 1991, Scranton 1997). But Chandler is right to
point out both the novelty and the “clustering” of large multi-unit enterprises
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. My argument is that, in
the late twentieth century, the factors that led to such clusters disappeared: multiunit enterprises remain part of the landscape, and will continue to arise when
circumstances dictate.3 But they are an increasingly small part of a landscape that
features a wide variety of market and network forms. Moreover, with growth in
the extent of the market and the evolution of market-supporting institutions, the

3

For example, in the 1980s, when vertical unbundling was the rule of the day, Nicolas Hayek
was busy creating a Chandlerian corporation out of the remnants of the fragmented Swiss
watch industry (Langlois 1998). He needed to rearrange capabilities in a systemic way – and
to do it quickly – in the face of creative destruction wrought by the Japanese development of
electronic watch movements, which had rendered obsolete existing Swiss capabilities in
mechanical movements. Centralized ownership and control was the most effective way to
bring about the necessary reorganization.
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average multi-unit enterprise today is less vertically integrated than its counterpart
in the Chandlerian era.
My argument takes as its primary analytical lens not the mainstream
economics of organization (Williamson 1985; Milgrom and Roberts 1992) but
rather an evolutionary capabilities approach (Langlois and Robertson 1995). In
this respect, my account stays true to Chandler even while placing him in a larger
frame.

As in Chandler, secular changes in relative prices attendant on

“globalization” (driven by technology or politics) affect economic organization not
only directly but also, and perhaps more importantly, indirectly through changes
in technology. Production costs matter as much as transaction costs (Langlois and
Foss 1999). Moreover, the kind of transaction costs that matter in history are often
not those of the Williamson kind but those I have labeled dynamic transaction costs
(Langlois 1992b). Costs of coordinating through markets may be high simply
because existing markets – or, more correctly, existing market-supporting
institutions – are inadequate to the needs of new technology and of new profit
opportunities. But when markets are given time and a larger extent, they tend to
“catch up,” and it starts to pay to delegate more and more activities rather than to
direct them administratively within a corporate structure.4

4

Far from being inherently superior, managerial hierarchies – like most organizational
structures – are a second-best solution that emerges in want of better alternatives.
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The evolutionary design problem.
Industrial structure, then, is really about two interrelated but conceptually
distinct systems: the technology of production and the organizational structure
that directs production. These systems jointly must solve the problem of value:
how to deliver the most utility to ultimate consumers at the lowest cost.
Industrial structure is an evolutionary design problem. It is also a continually
changing problem, one continually posed in new ways by factors like
population, real income, and the changing technology of production and
transaction. It was one of the founding insights of transaction-cost economics
that the technological system does not fully determine the organizational system
(Williamson 1975). Organizations — governance structures — bring with them
their own costs, which need to be taken into account. But technology clearly
affects organization. This is Chandler’s claim. The large-scale, high-throughput
technology of the nineteenth century “required” vertical integration and
conscious managerial attention. In order to explicate this claim, we need to
explore the nature of the evolutionary design problem that industrial structure
must solve.
Like a biological organism, an organization confronts an environment that
is changing, variable, and uncertain. To survive and prosper, the organization
must perceive and interpret a variety of signals from the environment and adjust
its conduct in light of those signals. In short, organizations are information
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processing systems. This is no less true of early nineteenth century production
networks than it is of an Internet-enabled firm of today: in a real sense, the
economy has long been a knowledge economy. Also like biological organisms,
business organizations differ in the mechanisms they use to process information
and to deal with variation and uncertainty. Nonetheless, as James Thompson
(1967, p. 20) argued, all organizations respond to a changing environment by
seeking to “buffer environmental influences by surrounding their technical cores
with input and output components.”

Understanding the ways in which

organizations buffer uncertainty is thus crucial to understanding organizational
structure.
In Thompson’s discussion, buffers seem to take many forms. The “input
and output components” he refers to are various kinds of shock-absorbers
mediating between a highly variable environment and a more predictable
production process. Inventories are a classic example: they can ebb and swell
with changes in demand or supply while allowing a smooth flow of product.
But Thompson also mentions preventive maintenance, which reduces the
number of unplanned outages, as well as the training or indoctrination of
personnel, which reduces variability in human performance.
Arthur Stinchcombe (1990) has picked up the human-performance thread
and pulled it in a more useful direction. In his interpretation, a skilled human is
an information-processing system that can serve as an important element in the
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process of buffering uncertainty. Human cognition can often interpret the data
from a complex environment and translate that data into the kinds of predictable
or routine information the productive system can use. For example, a professor
translates the complex information on an essay exam into a letter grade that the
Registrar’s office can process; a physician translates the complex inputs from
observation and medical instrumentation into a diagnosis, which results in a
relatively unambiguous set of instructions for nurses, pharmacists, patients, etc.
(Stinchcombe 1990, chapter 2). Business people serve a similar function. They
translate complex data from the economic environment into a more-or-less
predictable flow of outputs — contracts signed, products delivered, etc. We
might even go so far as to associate the buffering role that human cognition plays
in business with the very idea of management.
Levinthal and March (1993, p. 98) add a perspective on buffering that is
relevant to my argument.

They associate Thompson’s notion with the late

Herbert Simon’s (1962) well-known analysis of system decomposition.

A

decomposable system is one that is cut into pieces or “modularized” in such a way
that most interactions (which we can think of as flows of information) take place
within the modules; interactions among modules are kept to a minimum and are
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regularized through formal “interfaces.”5

One of the prime benefits of

decomposability, in Simon’s view, is that it allows for greater stability in the face
of environmental uncertainty: a single piece can be altered, replaced, or even
destroyed without threatening the survival of the whole. This is already a kind
of buffering. Levinthal and March point out that decomposition entails (or at
least allows) “loose coupling” between organizational units, which effectively
simplifies the information-processing problem the organization faces.

Each

department can concentrate on the local consequences of the information it
receives from the environment without having to contemplate the global
implications. Computer scientists would call this distributed processing. And
economists would recognize the argument as akin to F. A. Hayek’s (1945) famous
account of the price system as a well-decomposed information-processing
system.

Indeed, I will suggest before long that the decomposition of

organization into market can sometimes confer additional buffering benefits well
known to economists, notably the ability to spread risks.
In what follows, I trace the history of how organization in the United
States has confronted its evolutionary design problem over the last two centuries.
The underlying process, I argue, is the Smithian one of specialization and
differentiation of function. But, as expanding markets and technological change

5

A perfectly decomposable system is one in which all interactions are kept within the
subsystems. In reality, however, the best we can probably hope for is a system that is nearly
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altered the economic environment, so were altered the buffering problems
industry faced. The managerial revolution of the nineteenth century was one
solution to the buffering problem, appropriate to its time and place. But it is by
no means the only solution industry has found; and it is certainly not the
approach toward which the new economy is gravitating.

Antebellum organization.
Along one dimension, the American system of production and distribution in the
early years of the nineteenth century was indeed coordinated by the invisible
hand of the market. The high cost of inland transportation created many isolated
local markets, leading to a fragmented and decentralized system of production
and distribution.6 To the extent that it was possible to aggregate demands, it was
the independent merchant or middleman who did so.
Looked at in another way, however, the antebellum value chain reflected
a low level of specialization, just as one would expect in a thinly populated
country with poorly integrated regional markets. The focus of the economy was
not on manufacturing, which was still a matter of local crafts production, but
rather on trade.

And the central actors were the all-purpose generalist

decomposable. For a further discussion of these ideas and of the theory of modular systems
more generally, see Langlois (2002).
6

The main constraint, of course, was the capacity of horse-drawn wagons and the sorry state
of the network of dirt roads. Indeed, as late as the early twentieth century, “economists
estimated that it cost more to haul a bushel of wheat along ten miles of American dirt road
than it did to ship it across the ocean from New York to Liverpool” (Gladwell 2001, p. 13).
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merchants. Merchants always specialized on those margins where specialization
made economic sense; but there were relatively few such margins in the
antebellum period.

Thus, rather than concentrating on a narrow range of

commodities or on a single aspect of trade, merchants tended to diversify fairly
widely; and they acquired a wide range of skills necessary to trade.7

The

merchants were generalists, of course, because the volume of trade was too small
to support specialization. Only by aggregating demands for a variety of types of
goods could they generate sufficient scale to employ their overhead resources
adequately. This meant in addition that marketing techniques, and in many
cases the goods themselves, remained “generic” or nonspecialized in order to
permit the necessary diversification.
Since the antebellum industrial system relied heavily on markets to
coordinate among stages of production and distribution, there was a certain
amount of “loose coupling” that helped to buffer variation. Inventories were no
doubt in widespread use. More generally, the system employed as a buffering
mechanism what Jay Galbraith (1973, pp. 22ff.) called “slack resources”: the
antebellum economy was not a fast-paced, high-throughput system. But it’s also

7

“The merchants’ strength rested not so much on their mastery of the ancillary techniques of
shipping, insurance, finance, and the like, as on their ability to use them in support of the
fundamental trading function, buying and selling at a profit. The merchants exercised this
function over a range of goods as varied as the commercial techniques they employed. The
histories of individual firms, as well as merchants’ advertisements in colonial and early
national period newspapers, demonstrate the merchants’ willingness to sell anything that
offered a profit. Coffee, sugar, iron, cloth — all were grist for the merchants’ mills” (Porter
and Livesay 1971, p. 17).
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important to notice that, because the system reflected a relatively low level of
division of labor in the Smithian sense, much of the coupling, loose or otherwise,
was effected by human cognition. Each stage of production encompassed many
sub-stages that a larger extent of the market might have transformed into
specialties. As a result, buffering by skilled humans played an important role. In
crafts production, for example, both parts and finished products could exhibit
considerable variation because the artisan, who personally undertook all or most
stages of production, was able to buffer the variation in the parts and the
variation in the tastes of consumers. Wielding a wide repertoire of skills in a
flexible way (Leijonhufvud 1986), a crafts artisan can translate complex
information about tastes and technology into a working finished product.
The most important buffers in the antebellum period (and indeed for
centuries before that) were the generalist merchants. It was they who in effect
provided the (loose) coupling within the market economy. Despite the recurrent
features of trading in otherwise diverse goods, the thinness of antebellum
markets confronted these merchants with a wide variety of concrete
circumstances and special problems to solve on a daily basis. Like crafts artisans,
they needed to integrate a wide variety of tasks and process a wide range of
signals from the environment.

What enabled them to solve these complex

information processing problems was the width of their sets of skills and their
flexibility in matching skills to problems (Stinchcombe 1990, pp. 33-38). They
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noticed profit opportunities and solved a myriad practical problems in a way
that resulted in the more-or-less smooth delivery of goods and services. In the
low-fixed-cost economy of the period, profitability depended not on the
ownership of tangible assets but on specialized knowledge and the ability to
adapt.
In the years after 1815, population growth, geographical expansion, and
international trade (especially in cotton) combined to increase the extent of the
market in a classic Smithian way: by an increase in the volume of goods traded
but without much change in the nature of those goods (Porter and Livesay 1971,
p. 17). And, as one would predict, merchants began to specialize to a somewhat
greater extent by commodity or function, almost always by means of specialized
firms rather than through intra-firm specialization.
But merchants were far from completely specialized. Importantly, many
merchants combined the middleman function with a financial function,
something that was crucial for the development of American manufacturing
before the Civil War (Porter and Livesay 1971, pp. 71ff.). As America began
industrializing, the manufacturing sector was chronically undercapitalized,
especially with respect to working capital.

Investment is always a difficult

business because of the problem of asymmetric information: the borrower
typically has better information about his or her prospects than does the lender.
In the absence of institutions designed to reduce these “agency costs,” lenders
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will be reluctant to part with their money unless they have good information
about the borrower and can cheaply monitor the use of the funds. Many firms in
the metals and mechanical trades were forced to rely on the private funds of the
owner-manager or on retained earnings.

Increasingly, however, merchants

became an important source of financing. Since they dealt regularly with the
manufacturers, they had knowledge of their operations and could observe the
use of funds lent.8

To the extent that banks of the period helped finance

industrial development, they did so not as arms’-length lenders but as inside
lenders to the networks of merchants and manufacturers who were their
principal stockholders.9 We can understand this as an instance of using human
information processing as a “buffer” on the financial side: closely observing
production, or even taking a hand in directing it, is a way of managing the
uncertainty of capital provision.

8

For example, the merchant James Laughlin bankrolled the Jones and Lauth iron works,
which prospered to become the Jones and Laughlin Steel Corporation (Porter and Livesay
1971, p. 67).

9

As Naomi Lamoreaux (1986, p. 659) has shown in the case of New England, the function of
banks in this era “was to serve as the financial arms of the extended kinship groups that
dominated the economy. As such, banks provided kinship groups with a stable institutional
base from which to raise the capital consumed by their diverse business enterprises. Like
their modern counterparts, then, early banks tapped the savings of the surrounding
community, but they did so mainly selling shares of stock, not by attracting deposits. This
too was an important difference. It meant that these early institutions functioned less like
modern commercial banks and more like investment pools through which outsiders could
participate in the kinship groups’ diverse enterprises.” The function of banks may have
differed somewhat in the South and Mid Atlantic States (Bodenhorn 2000), but the
standardization of lending into specialized banks had to await thicker markets.
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Thus the “value chain” in the U. S. in the early years of the nineteenth
century was one dominated by merchant middlemen, who lowered transaction
and agency costs by aggregating outputs and demands from widely dispersed
producers and consumers as well as providing capital for the growth of
manufacturing.

The managerial revolution.
Is change ultimately a gradual process or is it one that operates through
discontinuous jumps or revolutions?

This is one of the hoary questions of

economic history — and, indeed, of social theory more generally. One’s answer
to the question is almost always a matter of perspective. From one viewpoint,
for example, the coming of the railroad and telegraph by the time of the Civil
War was merely the continuation of a process of decreasing transportation costs
already in motion. By 1857, one could travel about twice as far from New York
in a day as had been possible in 1830. But the same could be said of the change
between 1800 and 1830 (Paullin 1932, plate 138).

From another viewpoint,

however, the railroad and telegraph had a profound and discontinuous effect on
the organization of production and distribution in the United States.
The important consequence of the lowering of transportation and
communications costs, of course, was the collapse of geographical barriers and
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the increasing integration of the domestic market.10 In effect, nineteenth-century
technical change in transportation and communication brought about an allAmerican version of “globalization,” a topic to which we will return. Larger
markets made it possible to adopt new techniques in many transformational and
distributional stages in order to take advantage of economies of scale.11 With
larger markets to serve, it became economical to reorganize some stages using a
finer and more coordinated division of labor, what Leijonhufvud (1986) calls
factory production. It also became economical to use larger and more durable
machines that were often capable of integrating multiple stages of production.12
In both cases, larger markets allowed a shift to higher-fixed-cost methods, which
were capable of lowering unit costs — often dramatically — at high levels of
output.
All of this altered the value chain in two ways. First, it reduced the
number of establishments necessary at some transformation and distribution

10

Some numbers: Between 1869 and 1902, the cost of shipping a quarter of wheat from
Chicago to New York by lake and rail fell by 72 per cent; the cost of shipping the same
quarter by rail alone fell 71 per cent (Findlay and O’Rourke 2002, p. 31). Between 1870 and
1910, the price spread for wheat between New York City and Iowa fell from 69 to 19 per
cent; between New York and Wisconsin it fell from 52 to 10 per cent (Williamson 1974, p.
259).

11

This is not to say that the rise of large establishments and mass production obliterated
specialty producers or the market economy. Small-scale flexible production grew alongside
the large firms, provided those firms with many needed inputs, and contributed importantly
to economic growth (Atack 1986, Supple 1991, Scranton 1997). Nonetheless, the multi-unit
mass-producers represented an important new element to industrial structure, one calling
out for economic explanation.

12

I distinguish these two results of the increasing extent of the market as the division-of-labor
effect and the volume effect (Langlois 1999a, 1999b).
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stages. When market size permits economies of scale, a few large plants can
operate more cheaply — often far more cheaply — than a larger number of small
plants. As Chandler tells the tale, consolidation often played out through a set of
typical episodes.

First came the cartel, in which previously insulated

competitors, having suddenly found themselves operating in the same large
market, attempted to manage the allocation of output. Predictably, this met with
little success, which prompted the formation of a holding company. By pooling
ownership in a single meta-company, in which each individual owner would
take a share, the holding company transformed an incentive to cheat on the cartel
into an incentive to maximize total capital value. The unintended consequence
of this, however, was that the holding company took on a life of its own.
Especially as the original owners died out or cashed out, the head office began
managing production and investment in increasingly coherent ways, normally
with a view to consolidating production in the larger and more efficient plants.
The culmination of this was the multidivisional (M-Form) corporation in the
twentieth century, in which the old structure of many identical independent
producers had been transmogrified into a unified structure with a wholly new
functional division of administrative responsibility. Not all cases followed this
model, of course. In fields with few incumbent producers, large unified firms
grew up more-or-less directly.
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The position of the middleman in the value chain also changed
dramatically. As transformation and distribution stages grew in size and shrank
in numbers, independent wholesalers were increasingly replaced by in-house
purchasing and marketing units.

This was so for two reasons.

First, the

demands of the high-throughput producers began reaching and exceeding the
capacities of the middlemen, thus eliminating one of the primary raisons d’être of
wholesalers, the ability to work at higher volumes than one’s customers13
(Chandler 1990, p. 29). Second, standardization of inputs and outputs militated
against another of the merchant’s comparative advantages, the ability to deal
with a diverse set of products (Porter and Livesay 1971). In some cases, like
petroleum, producers integrated all the way from raw materials to the final
consumer (McLean and Haigh 1954).
Chandler stresses the ways in which this process differed from what the
Smithian division of labor would have predicted; that is, he focuses on the ways
in which integration bypassed market relations among previously distinct stages.
But it is important to notice that, however visible the hand of management had
become, the process Chandler describes is at one level a fundamentally Smithian
one.

The rise of the modern corporation is very much about increased

specialization of function. In an owner-managed firm, management is a craft

13

As John D. Rockefeller said of Standard Oil, “we had to create selling methods far in
advance of what then existed; we had to dispose of two, or three, or four gallons of oil where
one had been sold before, and we could not rely upon the usual trade channels then existing
to accomplish this.” (Quoted in Chernow 1998, p. 252.)
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engaged in by amateurs; in the modern corporation, management is a
profession.14 Moreover, the multidivisional structure that modern corporations
came to adopt in the twentieth century reflects a decoupling of the strategic
functions from the day-to-day functions of management in order to cope with the
greater demands on managerial attention15 (Williamson 1985, pp. 279-283).
The clearest and most significant way in which the rise of the modern
corporation reflects specialization and division of labor, of course, is on the
financial side. The corporation evolved in conjunction with developments in
securities markets throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
(and, as we’ll see, beyond). These developments encouraged the separation of
ownership from control by creating alienable securities that could be traded on
increasingly liquid markets.

What made such markets possible was the

development of social institutions like the limited liability corporation as well as
standardized techniques for accounting and financial reporting. These latter

14

Take note that, although specialized to management, the manager was a generalist along
another important direction: the manager was skilled in general techniques of management
independent of any specific firm or industry. I return to this point below.

15

In Chandler’s eyes, this progressive specialization and separation of function during the rise
of the large corporation is indeed a large part of the secret of that system’s success. He
blames what he perceives to be Britain’s lag behind the U. S. and Germany on precisely the
British inability to specialize. “In most British enterprises senior executives worked closely
in the same office building, located in or near the largest plant, having almost daily personal
contact with, and thus directly supervising, middle and often lower-level managers. Such
enterprises had no need for the detailed organization charts and manuals that had come into
common use in large American and German firms before 1914. In these British companies,
selection to senior positions and to the board depended as much on personal ties as on
managerial competence. The founders and their heirs continued to have a significant
influence on top-level decision-making even after their holdings in the enterprise were
diminished.” (Chandler 1990, p. 242.)
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made it easier for investors to ascertain the value of securities without detailed
knowledge of the business or geographic proximity to it, thus somewhat
attenuating the costs of asymmetric information (Baskin 1988, pp. 227-230). By
reducing the entry requirements to capital supply and by permitting
unprecedented opportunities for risk diversification, the development of
anonymous securities markets lowered the costs of capital for high-throughput
projects and allowed managers to lay off some of the risks — that is, the financial
risks — on anonymous markets (Jensen and Meckling 1976). In effect, then, the
function of “buffering” financial uncertainties was transferred in part from
human information processors — generalist managers — to external market
institutions armed with the buffering mechanism of portfolio diversification.
Nonetheless, as Chandler insists, along another dimension the rise of the
large corporation reflected a process of reduced specialization. Whereas distinct
sets of managers had once supervised each stage of production, with only the
market standing above them, in the era of the large corporation a single set of
managers came to supervise multiple stages of production. At the operational
level, of course, the division of labor didn’t necessarily decrease and may have
increased. Each subunit of the large corporation had its specialized managers,
the counterparts to the managers of the previously distinct stages. Integration of
the management function took place at a “corporate” level higher than the dayto-day managers. The head office oversaw multiple stages of production in
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much the way a crafts artisan may have overseen multiple stages in the making
of an artifact.
Why integration? I have long argued that one can’t explain organizational
structures without looking at the dynamic processes in which they are created
(Langlois 1984).

In my view, centralized organization often supplants more

decentralized organization when technological and market opportunities call for
a systemic reorganization of the structure of production and distribution. This is
so for the same reason that decision-making becomes more centralized during a
war or other crisis. When many different pieces of the system must be changed
simultaneously to create new value, centralized control can often help overcome
the narrow visions of the local participants, and centralized ownership can more
easily trump the vested interests of those participants (Langlois 1988; Bolton and
Farrell 1990). In short, vertical integration often occurs when it can overcome the
dynamic transaction costs of systemic change (Langlois 1992b).
In many of the nineteenth-century industries Chandler chronicles, the
possibilities of economies of scale at various transformation stages called for
systemic reorganization in other complementary parts of the system. Consider
the story of refrigerated meatpacking (Chandler 1977, p. 299 ff.; Porter and
Livesay 1971, pp. 168-173; Fields 2003). In the 1870s, the developing railroad
network had permitted the shipment of western meat on the hoof to eastern
markets, thus taking advantage of economies of scale in western pasturing. But
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further economies of scale were possible, and Gustavus Swift realized that, if the
system of meat packing, shipping, and distribution were completely redesigned,
it would be possible to reduce transportation costs and to take advantage of a
number of scale economies, including those of a “disassembly line” in a highthroughput slaughterhouse.

Claiming these economies required changing

complementary assets and capabilities throughout the system, including the
development and production of refrigerated rail cars and the establishment of a
nation-wide network of properly equipped branch houses to store and
merchandise the meat. Swift found it more economical to integrate into many of
these complementary stages than to face the dynamic transaction costs of
persuading the various asset owners to cooperate with him through the market.16

16

Raff and Temin (1991) have attempted to interpret this episode within the strict confines of
the doctrine of asset specificity (Klein, Crawford, and Alchian 1978). According to this
doctrine, which has arguably become the dominant explanation of vertical integration in the
literature of academic economics, cooperating parties are impelled to merge their operations
when one or both hold assets highly specific to the transaction they contemplate. This is
because in a market setting one of the parties could threaten the other with “hold-up,” thus
putting the specific assets at risk. Raff and Temin make an excellent case. But the case they
make is mine. They claim that Swift integrated widely because (and only because) all of the
assets he came to own were transaction specific and would have put him at risk of
expropriation had he left them in the hands of others. Some of the assets involved – railroad
cars, maybe – might fit this profile. But many other things Swift bought – like ice --were
clearly generic commodities obtainable in thick markets. Raff and Temin try to explain this
away: “But Swift could not rely on independent suppliers to provide ice at the time and
place he needed. And the cost to him of being without ice at that time and place was very
great. … Swift could be held up by the owner of an icehouse who had the only ice in the
neighborhood” (p. 25). But this won’t do. The theory of asset specificity is an equilibrium
proposition. In equilibrium, no ice-house master could have threatened to hold Swift up,
since Swift had a credible threat to replace his custom, and none of Swift’s assets would
depreciate in equilibrium as a result. Of course, Swift cared not a wit about equilibrium. He
was worried about all interruptions in service, which – and here is the point – could happen
for many reasons in addition to hold-up threats. The ice-house owner could simply be
incompetent, or he could have a bad hair day. (Or Swift had acquired superior capabilities
for managing the movement of ice to refrigerated cars because he had specialized in that
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As Porter and Livesay (1971, p. 171) argue, the development of an integrated
(non-independent) system of branch houses was “a response to the inadequacies
of the existing jobber system.”
But explaining the origins of vertical integration (or any other structure of
organization) doesn’t necessarily explain why that structure persists.

If

integration is temporarily necessary but otherwise grossly inefficient, we would
expect the integration to be undone over time. And there are certainly examples
of this.17

But it is also possible that a structure of organization can persist

because of “path dependence.” A structure can be self-reinforcing in ways that
make it difficult to switch to other structures.

For example, the nature of

learning within a vertically integrated structure may reinforce integration, since
learning about how to make that structure work may be favored over learning

business, and it was more costly for him to transfer that knowledge to others than to
integrate.) Even if the owner is guileless and well intentioned, the high-throughput system
would be at risk. Nor does it help to say that, although nonspecific in any ordinary sense,
the ice had the character of time specificity or location specificity. Apart from forcing the
notion of asset specificity to dance on the head of a pin, this ignores the fact that the costs of
time and location specificity – what I call dynamic transaction costs (Langlois 1992b) – do
not depend on the threat of holdup but can arise from a multitude of causes. The threat of
hold-up in the face of specific assets is but a small subset of the much wider problems of
buffering that managers of high-throughput systems face.
17

As Chandler (1992, pp. 88-89) notes: “integration … should be seen in terms of the
enterprise's specific capabilities and needs at the time of the transaction. For example,
Williamson (1985, p. 119) notes that: ‘Manufacturers appear sometimes to have operated on
the mistaken premise that more integration is always preferable to less.’ He considers
backward integration at Pabst Brewing, Singer Sewing Machine, McCormack [sic]
Harvester, and Ford ‘from a transaction cost point of view would appear to be mistakes.’
But when those companies actually made this investment, the supply network was unable to
provide the steady flow of a wide variety of new highly specialized goods essential to assure
the cost advantages of scale. As their industries grew and especially as the demand for
replacement parts and accessories expanded, so too did the number of suppliers who had
acquired the necessary capabilities.”

- 23 -

about alternative structures.18 A structure may also persist simply because the
environment in which it operates is not rigorous enough to demand change.
And organizations can sometimes influence their environments — by soliciting
government regulation, for instance — in ways that reduce competitive rigors.
In the end, however, structures that persist for significant amounts of time
may indeed do so because they solve the design problem well — or at least well
enough.19

Surely this is Chandler’s claim:

the large vertically integrated

managerial corporation persisted because it was the appropriate solution for the
design problem of its day.

Reading Chandler and his interpreters, we can

discern the outlines of that solution.
At the price of high fixed costs, one could create low average costs — at
least so long as one could reliably utilize the fixed assets to capacity.
In the capital-intensive industries the throughput needed to
maintain minimum efficient scale requires careful coordination not
only of the flow through the processes of production but also of the
flow of inputs from suppliers and the flow of outputs to
intermediaries and final users.
Such coordination did not, and indeed could not, happen
automatically. It demanded the constant attention of a managerial
team or hierarchy. The potential economies of scale and scope, as
measured by rated capacity, are the physical characteristics of the
production facilities. The actual economies of scale or of scope, as
18

See Langlois and Robertson (1989, pp. 367-368) for an example from the early years of the
Ford Motor Company.

19

Biologists understand that, to avoid a tautological theory, evolutionary explanation must
mean showing how the biological structure in question would meet “an engineer’s criterion
of good design” (Gould 1977, p. 42).
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determined by throughput, are organizational. Such economies
depend on knowledge, skill, experience, and teamwork -- on the
organized human capabilities essential to exploit the potential of
technological processes. (Chandler 1990, p. 24.)
In a world of decentralized production, most costs are variable costs; so, when
variations or interruptions in product flow interfere with output, costs decline
more or less in line with revenues. But when high-throughput production is
accomplished by means of high-fixed-cost machinery and organization,
variations and interruptions leave significant overheads uncovered. Chandler
would say that uncontrolled variation in work flows lowers the effective
economies of scale available. Integration and management are an attempt to
control — to buffer — product-flow uncertainty.
Employing a finely sliced division of labor or large integrated machines or
both, traditional mass production always requires the elimination of variation
between stages of production. Although never fully realized until the day in
1908 when three of Henry Leland’s Cadillacs emerged perfect from a heap of
scrambled parts in Brooklands, Surrey,20 the promise of interchangeable parts
had animated the quest for mass production throughout the nineteenth century
(Hounshell 1984). As the Brooklands episode suggests, interchangeable parts
create a more modular design: parts can be swapped in and out. At the same

20

For this feat Leland was awarded the Dewar Trophy as winner of the first Standardization
Test of the Royal Automobile Club. Cadillac’s British operation had in fact instigated the
competition as a publicity stunt, and Cadillac was the only contestant; but Cadillac was also
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time, however, standardization eliminates one form of “loose coupling” possible
in crafts production.21

Variation in the components becomes increasingly

intolerable. In the classic form of mass production, so does variation in the final
product. Moreover, mass production requires operatives (including, eventually,
machines) to carry out an unambiguous sequence of steps — a computer
program, in effect. Thus the design of the overall production process becomes
more highly structured, while discretion and variation are eliminated from the
individual stages, a process that unsympathetic scholars have labeled
“deskilling” (Marglin 1974) and “fordism” (Sabel 1982).
One important implication of this is that standardization and high
throughput do not eliminate the need to buffer uncertainty; indeed, they make it
all the more urgent — for any variation that finds its way into a high-throughput
system can bring production to a crashing halt. What buffers uncertainty in
Chandlerian managerial capitalism is exactly what buffers uncertainty in crafts
production or non-specialized merchandising: the information-processing ability
of human managers.

Because of the new high-throughput structure of

production, however, that buffering is no longer distributed to the individual
stages of production — from which standardization has eliminated variation —

the only manufacturer capable of the precise machining tolerances necessary to pass the test
(Leland and Millbrook 1966, chapter 1).
21

Contrary to what is sometimes said in the literature on modular product design, modularity
does not imply loose coupling, nor does nonmodularity imply tight coupling.
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but has effectively moved “up the hierarchy” to the managers who control the
work flow22 (Stinchcombe 1990, p. 64).
Professional management is specialization in one sense: the manager is
manager only and not in any important way a capitalist or anything else. But,
like the merchant of yore, the manager is also a generalist: the manager is skilled
in general techniques of management independent of any specific firm or
industry. The nonspecific training of managers was abetted in the twentieth
century by the rise of the business school, which, like other professional schools
emerging at the same time, equipped its students with a standardized “toolkit”
(Langlois and Savage 2001).

This shouldn’t be surprising.

Chandlerian

managers are generalists for the same reason that crafts artisans and merchants
are generalists: because their function is to buffer uncertainty. They need a wide
range of skills that can be applied flexibly in response to an unpredictable array
of concrete circumstances.

From scale to scope: the corporate century.
In setting up managerial structures to buffer high-throughput production, the
large corporations of the late nineteenth century created something more: a

22

Top managers will not be the only buffers, of course. They will be aided by a large number
of discretionary workers at multiple levels. “There will generally be a separate set of skilled
manual work departments (maintenance, tool and die making, and special departments that
vary with the technology, such as the crew who lay firebricks inside steel furnaces) and
skilled staff workers at the managerial levels (engineering, quality control and inspection,
scheduling and inventory), besides the whole routinized structure of the production line and
the ‘line’ supervisory structure that keeps it running” (Stinchcombe 1990, p. 64).
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system of organizational capabilities.23 Geared initially toward the management of
scale, these organizational capabilities soon enabled corporations to expand their
scope.

In Chandler’s words, they “provided an internal dynamic for the

continuing growth of the enterprise. In particular, they stimulated its owners
and managers to expand into more distant markets in their own country and
then to become multinational by moving abroad. They also encouraged the firm
to diversify by developing products competitive in markets other than the
original one and so to become multiproduct enterprises” (Chandler 1990, pp 8-9).
As Edith Penrose (1959) had suggested, this is an important mechanism by
which firms grow.

In her theory, firms consist of bundles of “resources,”

including the managerial resources that Chandler and others call capabilities.
Resources are often lumpy, and some are therefore in excess capacity. This
means that organizational capabilities developed in one area can spill over to
new tasks at low marginal cost.

Indeed, economies of scale and scope are

ultimately made of the same stuff: they both involve the reuse of a structure of
knowledge, in one case to stamp out more of the same product, in the other case
to produce something different that requires similar knowledge (Langlois 1999b).
Especially early on, diversification was a matter of taking advantage of
byproducts — the classic economies of scope of the textbook. For example,

23

G. B. Richardson (1972, p. 888), who coined the term, called capabilities the “knowledge
experience, and skill” of the organization. For further discussion of this idea, see Langlois
and Robertson (1995, chapter2).
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Armour, Swift, and other meatpackers sold fertilizer, leather, glue, soap, and
other items made from the byproducts of the slaughterhouse (Chandler 1990, p.
168).

Significantly, firms diversified in a modular way by creating for the

various products new organizational units that could be dropped into the overall
corporate structure. By the twentieth century, however, diversification came to
flow more from reusable facilities, knowledge, and business practices.

For

instance, Swift and his competitors began to distribute butter, eggs, poultry, and
fruit using the distribution system originally set up for meat (Chandler 1990, p.
168). Notice that in moving from scale to scope, corporations became generalists
to a greater extent, thus reversing the original trend toward product-oriented
specialization — and away from generalist merchants — that had created those
corporations in the first place. I will suggest soon that the vanishing hand can be
understood in part as a continuation of this process of the broadening of
capabilities and their decoupling from specific products.
For most of the twentieth century, of course, the process of capabilitybuilding that Chandler describes did not challenge the structure of vertically
integrated managerial capitalism. Indeed, it reinforced it. As Chandler (1997, p.
64) notes, after world War II especially, “the essential large-scale investments in
both tangible and intangible capital were made not by new enterprises as they
had been in the past, but primarily by well-established firms whose existing
learned

organizational

capabilities

were
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critical

in

developing

and

commercializing the potential the new technologies on a global scale.” The large
corporations were recreating significant parts of the U. S. value chain along new
lines, which led them to grow internally in the path-dependent way implied by
Penrose’s theory.
Such growth placed increasing strain on corporate buffering mechanisms.
In part, the firms responded by decentralizing divisions, a kind of buffering in
emulation of the market.24

But, as Herbert Simon pointed out, buffering

mechanisms, which help an organization respond better to variation, are not the
only way to attack the problem of environmental uncertainty. “If we want an
organism or mechanism to behave effectively in a complex and changing
environment,” he wrote, “we can design into it adaptive mechanisms that allow
it to respond flexibly to the demands the environment places on it. Alternatively,
we can try to simplify and stabilize the environment. We can adapt organism to
environment or environment to organism” (Simon 1960, p. 33).

In the first

century of the managerial revolution, large firms did indeed seek to simplify and
stabilize their environments — a phenomenon that has absorbed the ink of
legions of economists and pundits over the years.
One class of such attempts falls within the broad purview of antitrust.
That Chandler’s large corporations have typically been discussed — and for long

24

“Although the transformation from functional to product organizations [the M-Form] has
usually been justified as a means to enhance control and coordination (Chandler 1962), it
also is a way of segregating experience” (Levinthal and March 1993, p. 98).
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periods exclusively discussed — from the perspective of trustification and
monopoly is a story too tedious to tell here, and perhaps too trite to be worth
telling. Virtually alone among writers on the subject, Joseph Schumpeter argued
that behavior derided as restrictive or “anticompetitive” actually can serve the
function of controlling environmental uncertainty in a way that facilitates highthroughput production — and thus increases rather than decreases output.
Practically any investment entails, as a necessary complement of
entrepreneurial action, certain safeguarding activities such as
insuring or hedging. Long-range investing under rapidly changing
conditions, especially under conditions that change or may change
at any moment under the impact of new commodities and
technologies, is like shooting at a target that is not only indistinct
but moving — and moving jerkily at that. Hence it becomes
necessary to resort to such protecting devices as patents or
temporary secrecy of processes or, in some cases, long-period
contracts secured in advance. But these protecting devices which
most economists accept as normal elements of rational
management are only special cases of a larger class comprising
many others which most economists condemn although they do
not differ fundamentally from the recognized ones. (Schumpeter
1950, p. 88.)
Schumpeter also had a more colorful term for what I have blandly called
environmental variation or uncertainty: “the perennial gale of creative
destruction” (Schumpeter 1950, p. 84).
Notice that Schumpeter sees the corporation’s “safeguarding activities” as
akin to buffering techniques like insuring and hedging. Let me focus in on a
couple of “protecting devices” that will be of significance down the road.
Chandler has long maintained that, in effect, vertical integration is itself a
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mechanism for controlling the environment — by putting large parts of that
environment under the influence of managerial buffering.

But within the

vertically integrated structure, the stages of production with high fixed cost play
a special role. Industrial organization economists have laid great stress on the
role of sunk costs in deterring competitive entry and generally slowing the
competitive environment (Baumol 1982, Sutton 1991). Fixed costs are not always
sunk costs, of course; but they tend to become so when markets for the fixed
assets are thin, as will be the case when those and comparable assets are isolated
within the internal production of vertically integrated firms. This is relevant to
my story: for when markets become thicker, the “sunk” character of assets
diminishes, which reduces the benefits of vertical integration.
In some lines of business, vertical integration also threw up transactioncost problems of a more traditional sort. This was especially true in consumer
goods but also in some kinds of producer goods as well. In the days of generalist
wholesalers and retailers, merchants were not only purveyors of goods but also
guarantors of quality.

Soap, flour, butter were undifferentiated products in

whose quality the customer trusted because he or she trusted the retailer, whose
good name served as a kind of bond.

As high-speed continuous-process

technology made it dramatically more economical for the producer rather than
the wholesaler or retailer to package commodities (Chandler 1977, pp. 289ff.), the
role of these latter in guaranteeing quality all but vanished. In principle, this
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meant that the costs to consumers of verifying quality would increase, perhaps
dramatically.

The solution to the problem, of course, was branding, which

allowed the producer to speak, as it were, directly to the consumer and to utilize
some of the same bonding mechanisms that the local grocer had once used25
(Klein and Leffler 1981). New generalist retailer like Sears and A&P also sprang
up to carry a wide variety of branded products, and these were able to add the
bonding power of their own names to that of the individual product brands,
sometimes even selling the commodities under their own house brand (Kim
2001). In addition, the large multiunit retailers were able to create capabilities,
and to exploit scale economies, in quality management and assurance.
Branding did more than solve a transaction-cost problem, of course. It
was another method of attempting to control the environment in order to reduce
variation and uncertainty.

25

This is clear even from a standard neoclassical

It is not correct to say, however, as Kim (2001) seems to imply, that the system of branded
products supplanted the earlier system because of its superior transaction-cost properties.
In Kim’s story, products became more sophisticated because of technological change,
making it harder for consumers to judge quality directly. This gave the advantage to big
chain stores, which had large amounts of capital with which to bond quality. As Chandler
shows, however, the principal innovations in this period were in the nature of process
technology. Soap, beans, butter, cigarettes, etc., didn’t change much — but they could be
packaged much more quickly by machine. Moreover, even in the early nineteenth century,
consumers could not directly discern the quality of products by casual inspection: many of
the most famous cases of adulteration involved simple commodities like bread or flour.
And small generalist retailers were often perfectly capable of certifying the weight and
purity of even sophisticated commodities like pharmaceuticals; only now are pharmacists
being supplanted by branding, and that is because of a change in the sophistication of
testing equipment as much as by changes in the drugs themselves (Savage 1994). In the end,
the system of branding arose to solve a transaction cost problem caused by — but that was
arguably small in comparison with — the major production-cost gains from new process
technology. Whether branding is superior to local certification and bonding on purely
transaction-cost grounds is an open question.
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textbook. By creating a product differentiated in the eyes of the consumer, a firm
can enjoy a more inelastic demand curve, which damps fluctuations in price and
quantity. And branding is what makes product differentiation possible. Even if
quality is the brand’s only distinguishing characteristic — as was arguably the
case for commodities like branded gasoline — branding will still have this
damping effect (Klein and Leffler 1981).
All of these methods of attempting to control the environment pale in
comparison with getting the government involved. Economists and political
scientists have long since come around to the idea that regulation is something
that firms and industries often work hard to bring upon themselves (Kolko 1963;
Stigler 1971). Politicians are often anxious to supply regulation, as it earns them
the political support they crave. And firms are equally anxious demanders of
regulation, as it serves their interests. Those interests are normally understood in
terms of increased profits from government-managed cartelization and
restrictions on competitive entry.
damping function.26

But clearly government can also serve a

It provides an environment alternative to, or at least

supplementary to, the market — an environment that is either inherently less
variable or that can be more easily dealt with by the buffering mechanisms of
management. Of course, not all industries fit this picture: it is doubtful that

26

Government may also be enlisted to serve the quality guaranteeing function alluded to
earlier. A classic example of this is the institution of federal inspection of meat (Libecap
1992).
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regulation of taxicabs in major cities or of interstate trucks under the old regime
of the Interstate Commerce Commission had much to do with buffering in a
world of high fixed costs. But many other industries, often supposed “natural
monopolies” in undifferentiated products like electricity, phone service, or
natural gas transmission, may have sought regulation in part to help control a
complex, internally managed production system containing critical components
with high fixed costs.27 Even in industries not directly regulated by agencies,
government action often came in handy as “safeguarding activities” to buffer
demand shocks or to provide a cushion of economic rents.
Although the problems of buffering high-throughput production have not
made much impression on the mainstream literature on government and
business, there is a line of thought along the fringes that takes this problem as
central. Running roughly from Thorstein Veblen (1921) to William Lazonick
(1991), this literature sees it as crucial that managers be insulated from the
vagaries of the environment, especially those caused by financial and other
markets. Veblen considered financial markets “industrial sabotage.” The most
eloquent voice in this tradition belonged, however, to John Kenneth Galbraith,

27

I don’t mean this to suggest that such regulation is therefore obviously desirable. Although
regulation may indeed serve the function of smoothing the environment, and thus of
helping a highly integrated structure to make good use of its high-throughput assets, it also
has the effect of freezing the environment and of insulating the organization from the
changing configuration of relative scarcities and transaction costs in the economy. Without
regulation, firms have to control variation by making themselves more adaptable, which
may be a better long-run outcome. At the end of the twentieth century, as we will see
presently, even regulation couldn’t protect firms from the need to adapt their structures.
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whose New Industrial State distilled through hyperbole the essence of the
corporate century he could see stretching behind him in 1967. Galbraith takes it
for granted that technological change always leads to greater complexity and
scale. This complexity and scale requires “planning”; such is the imperative of
technology, an imperative that can only grow stronger in the future. Planning
means not only the attempt to foresee and prepare for future contingencies but
also the removal of transactions from the market to the realm of managerial
authority.

“If, with advancing technology and associated specialization, the

market becomes increasingly unreliable, industrial planning will become
increasingly impossible unless the market also gives way to planning. Much of
what the firm regards as planning consists in minimizing or getting rid of market
influences”28 (Galbraith 1971, pp. 42-43).
It is perhaps a fitting reward for the hubris this view of planning implies
that the not-too-distant future had in store a picture of technology and
organization that would be virtually the diametric opposite of the one Galbraith
painted.

From internal to external capabilities: the new economy.
Ruttan and Hayami (1984) have proposed a theory of institutional change that is
relevant to my story of organizational-and-institutional change. As they see it,

28

The syllogism continues, of course. Since a little planning is good, a lot must surely be
better. So the government should largely replace the market system with central planning.
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changes in relative scarcities, typically driven by changes in technology, create a
demand for institutional change by dangling new sources of economic rent
before the eyes of potential institutional innovators. Whether change occurs will
depend on whether those in a position to generate it — or to block it — can be
suitably persuaded. Since persuasion typically involves the direct or indirect
sharing of the available rents, the probability of change increases as the rents
increase.

And the more an institutional or organization system becomes

misaligned with economic realities, the more the rents of realignment increase.
By the 1980s, the large corporation that had looked inevitable and
invincible in the 1950s and 1960s had become an organizational structure
increasingly misaligned with economic realities — and an organization in the
process of redefining itself. Quite apart from any mechanisms of environmental
control they may have themselves created, the large American corporations after
World War II benefited from the attenuated climate of competition that came
with the destruction of the German, Japanese, and other economies. As those
economies revived and trade began expanding by the 1970s, the easy life was
coming to an end. Indeed, by the 80s and 90s, the image of invincibility had been
virtually replaced by its opposite.

As Mark Roe notes, “the image of the

corporation as a sweating and not-always-successful competitor has become
more vivid” (Roe 1996, p. 106).
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The American corporation’s mechanisms of environmental control and its
charmed life in the 50s and 60s had permitted it largely to ignore ongoing
changes in the scale of technology as well as the increasing thickness and
realignment of markets. In startling contrast to Galbraith’s (rather nineteenthcentury) view of technological change, innovation often — and perhaps mostly
— proceeds by simplifying and by reducing scale.29 Arguably, this has been the
dominant trend of the twentieth century.30 For example, in electricity generation,
among the most scale-intensive of fields, the development of aero-derivative
combined-cycle generating technology (CCGT) has significantly reduced the
minimum efficient scale of new electric capacity (Joskow 1997, p. 123).

In

telephony, the rise of semiconductor technology in general and the development
of the private branch exchange (PBX) in particular turned switching from a
centralized to a decentralized-network technology (Vietor 1994, p. 188). At the
same time, rising populations, rising income, and newly vibrant international
trade generated thicker markets. This meant, among other things, that, even

29

This seems to have been Adam Smith’s (eighteenth-century) view. What drives innovation
is the desire to perform a given set of operations more elegantly and economically. (Smith
1976, I.1.8.)

30

I mean this as a long-run proposition. In the short run, innovation can certainly increase
scale. Moreover, the effect of technological change on scale is sometimes subtle, in that scale
reduction in one part of the system can lead to increased scale elsewhere. The advent of the
small electric motor (eventually) led to the demise of highly centralized steam power in
factories (David 1990); but it also increased the extent of the market for electric power and
(initially at least) helped increase the scale of its generation. Indeed, in some cases, the
Internet and FedEx have clearly had the same scale-increasing effect as the telegraph and the
railroad: think of Amazon.com. But over time, holding all else constant, the scale of a given
technology tends to decline. (On this point see also Langlois 1999a, p. 56.)
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where technology was not threatening to reduce scale, existing structures of
fixed cost shrank relative to the extent of the market. For example, by the time
CCGT had arrived, increases in market size had long since stripped electric
power generation of its natural-monopoly character (Joskow and Schmalensee
1983).
My argument is that these changes in technology and markets opened up
attractive rent-seeking possibilities that could be seized only by breaking down
or “unbundling” the vertical structure of the managerial corporation. This is
perhaps clearest in what most had long considered the intractable cases of
vertical integration: regulated utilities. We need only think of long-distance
telephony, in which a scale-reducing technical change — microwave
transmission, in this case — created opportunities for whoever could open up
AT&T’s legal hold on the field.31

Entrepreneur William McGowan of MCI

poured resources first into persuading the Federal Communications Commission
to alter its policies and then into fomenting the breakup of AT&T (Temin 1987).
Similar tales can be told for the deregulation of electricity (Kench 2000) and other
industries. A similar process of unbundling is also underway in less-regulated
industries, where the impediments to supplying organizational change are
substantially lower though not necessarily absent.

31

In this case, the possibilities arose in part because of AT&T’s pricing structure, which for
political reasons had subsidized local service at the expense of long distance — a
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In some respects, the internal dynamic of scale and scope that Chandler
chronicles contributed in an almost Hegelian fashion to the corporation’s own
undoing.

Driven by the Chandler-Penrose imperative to apply existing

managerial skills and other capabilities more widely, the corporation in the 1960s
took the idea of diversification to new levels.32

ITT was the paradigm.

Originally an international supplier of telephone switching equipment, it bought,
among other things, an insurance company, a hotel chain, and the maker of
Hostess Twinkies. In assembling conglomerates, as Mark Roe (1996, p. 113)
argues, “managers learned that they could move subsidiaries and divisions
around like pieces on a chessboard.”
Conglomerates were assembled from separate firms, with a central
headquarters directing the firm. Their widespread use in the 1960s
taught managers that it was possible to mix and match corporate
divisions. It was only a small leap of an organizational idea for a
conglomerate to bring in an outside firm via a hostile acquisition by
buying up the target’s stock and tucking the formerly independent
firm in as one now managed from the conglomerate headquarters.
From there it was only another small mental jump in the 1980s to
understand that once the pieces of a conglomerate had been
assembled, they could be disassembled as well. (Roe 1996, p. 114.)
Notice also that the managers could move divisions around like pieces on a
chessboard in the first instance because of the modular structure of the M-form.

misalignment with relative scarcities made possible by AT&T’s status as a regulated
monopoly (Vietor 1994, p. 183).
32

Of course, there were institutional factors as well. Roe (1996) points to the favorable tax
treatment of retained earnings relative to dividends. Shleifer and Vishny (1991) argue that
stringent antitrust policy in the 1960s discouraged cash-rich firms from acquiring companies
in related industries, forcing them into unrelated diversification.
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Aided by innovations in the securities markets, the leveraged-buyout
wave of the 1980s disassembled the conglomerate of the 1960s. “By and large,”
write Bhagat, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990, p. 2), “hostile takeovers represent the
deconglomeration

of

American

business

and

a

return

to

corporate

specialization.” Indeed, specialization became the strategic catchword of the
1990s. Whereas the most influential text on corporate strategy in 1980, that of
Michael Porter, had counseled its readers to profit through buffering
mechanisms and the control of the environment, the leading gurus of the next
decade taught that the keys to success lay within and that firms could prosper
only by returning to their core competences (Prahalad and Hamel 1990).
Shoemaker, stick to your last.
What has been less well observed, however, is that the changes of the
1980s did not amount to a return to the pre-conglomerate days of the 1950s, to
the “modern corporation” that Chandler had described. Something fundamental
had changed. If a corporation – even a non-conglomerated one – is an amalgam
of division-modules, then the logical extension of the idea of corporate
specialization would be to hive off not only unrelated divisions but also
vertically related divisions as well. As G. B Richardson (1972) pointed out, it is
highly unlikely that the various vertical stages of a production process should all
call for similar kinds of capabilities.
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And this is what has happened. “Even a cursory examination of the
industrial system of the United States in the 1990s reveals organizational patterns
that look not at all like the modern corporation,” writes Timothy Sturgeon.
The largest single employer in the country is not General Motors,
but a temporary employment agency called Manpower Inc. The
largest owner of passenger jets is not United Airlines, or any other
major carrier, but the aircraft leasing arm of General Electric.
American automakers have spun-off their in-house parts
subsidiaries and outsourced the design and manufacture of entire
automotive sub-systems to first-tier suppliers. Since 1992, IBM has
literally turned itself inside-out, becoming a merchant provider of
the basic components it had previously guarded so jealously for
exclusive use in its own products. If what we see today seems to
have little relation to the ideal type of the modern corporation,
there may be good reason. Perhaps the American industrial system
has begun to adapt to the new, more intense global competitive
environment that triggered the competitive crisis in the first place.
Perhaps we are witnessing the rise of a new American model of
industrial organization, and not simply the resurgence of the old
(Sturgeon 2002, p. 454).
In many respects, the structure of this new model looks more like that of the
antebellum era than like that of the era of managerial capitalism. Production
takes place in numerous distinct firms, whose outputs are coordinated through
market exchange broadly understood. It is in this sense that the visible hand of
management is disappearing. Unlike the antebellum structure, however, the
new economy is a high-throughput system, with flows of work even more
closely coordinated than in a classic Chandlerian hierarchy.
Vertical disintegration and specialization is perhaps the most significant
organizational development of the 1990s. My goal is to explain this development
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not to document it. But the evidence is clear. Measuring vertical integration is
never easy; but, using trade-flow data, international economists have found that
the “rising integration of world markets has brought with it a disintegration of
the production process … . Companies are now finding it profitable to outsource
increasing amounts of the production process, a process which can happen either
domestically or abroad. This represents a breakdown in the vertically-integrated
mode of production — the so-called ‘Fordist’ production, exemplified by the
automobile industry — on which American manufacturing was built” (Feenstra
1998, p. 31). Using Canadian census data, Baldwin, Beckstead, and Caves (2002)
found that Canadian firms have increased plant and firm specialization in
secular fashion as the extent of the market has grown, with increases in
commodity specialization accelerating after 1988 as a result of the North
American Free Trade Agreement.
The anecdotal evidence is equally compelling. In electronics, firms like
Sanmina-SCI, Solectron, and Flextronics specialize in assembling on contract
electronic systems of all sorts (Sturgeon 2002). But they neither design33 nor
distribute nor market the systems themselves. Indeed, in early 2002, IBM – the
originator of the dominant personal computer standard – sold its entire domestic

33

More correctly, they do not brand their own systems. These firms will often supply design
and engineering services when asked. For example, Flextronics and Solectron not only
manufactured the Handspring Visor but were also involved in its design in order to smooth
manufacturing and quicken time to market (Dolan and Meredith 2001). On the other hand,
design services are a specialty that can also be purchased on the market. Ideo, a specialist
design firm, is responsible for another Handspring model, the Visor Edge.
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assembly operations to Sanmina-SCI (Bulkeley 2002). In pharmaceuticals, the
major integrated companies are increasingly outsourcing manufacturing and
marketing to firms like DSM and clinical trials to contract research firms like
Quintiles Transnational and Covance (Dolan and Meredith 2001). A major new
trend in semiconductor manufacturing has been the rise of so-called fabless
semiconductor firms. These firms retain design, development, and marketing
functions but do not own their own manufacturing plants (called “fabs” in
industry argot); instead, they contract out the actual manufacture of the chips to
specialized “silicon foundries” (Langlois and Steinmueller 1999, p. 51). Led by
Chrysler in the 1990s, American automobile manufacturers began to modularize
their product design and supply chain strategies and to rely more heavily on
subcontractors (Fine 1998, pp. 61-62). The American Big Three automakers spun
off individual parts units like Delphi and Visteon, and in 2000 they and several
other car makers formed an electronic B2B supplier network called Covisint. If
Gustavus Swift were looking to ship ice reliably today, he could call on any
number of third-party logistics suppliers like Bax Global, Menlo Worldwide, or
Ryder. The litany could continue.
This is specialization, of course. But notice also that these subcontractors
are also generalists. Flextronics will put together virtually any kind of electronic
device you ask it to; DSM will produce whatever drug you hand it; and the
silicon foundries of Taiwan (and elsewhere) will manufacture whatever chip
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design you send them electronically. In the auto industry, parts suppliers are
generalizing their capabilities across major subsystems (Fine 1998, p. 65).
This coupling of specialization of function with generalization of
capabilities recalls the generalist merchants of the early republic.34 It is in fact a
typical feature of the Smithian process. In his famous analysis of that process,
George Stigler (1951, p. 192) referred to what he called “general specialties.” He
had in mind activities like railroads, shipping, and banking that can benefit a
variety of industries; but contract suppliers are clearly examples in the small –
microcosmic instances of what economists now call general-purpose technologies
(Helpman 1998). This trend toward general specialties is a continuation of the
process of decoupling capabilities from products that Chandler observed in Scale
and Scope.

It is also a mechanism by which the market system buffers

uncertainty. Since a general specialist is not tied to a particular product or brand,
taking in work from many purveyors of products and brands, it can diversify its
portfolio more effectively.

This smoothes demand and facilitates high-

throughput production.
Among the most important general-purpose technologies are social
institutions. Just as decentralization of the stages of production depends on the
extent of the market, so the extent of the market depends on institutions that

34

Not to mention Chandlerian managers, who specialized in management but possessed
general management capabilities.
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support specialization and exchange. Secure and alienable property rights are
one example, but there are more specific institutions at work in particular
markets. Many of these take the form of standards. Decentralization implies an
ability to cut apart the stages of production cleanly enough that they can be
placed into separate hands without high costs of coordination; that is to say,
decentralization implies some degree of standardization of “interfaces” between
stages. In an extreme – but far from rare – case, standardized interfaces can turn
a product into a modular system (Langlois and Robertson 1992).
Just as did the high-throughput technologies of classical mass production,
modular systems require and arise out of standardization. But unlike classical
mass-production technologies, which standardize the products or processes
themselves, modular systems standardize something more abstract: the rules of
the game, or what Baldwin and Clark (2000) call visible design rules. So long as
they adhere to these rules, participants need not communicate the details of their
own activities, which become hidden design parameters. By taking standardization
to a more abstract level, modularity reduces the need for management and
integration to buffer uncertainty. One way in which it does so is simply by
reducing the amount of product standardization necessary to achieve high
throughput.

This is the much-remarked-upon phenomenon of mass

customization (Cox and Alm 1998). For example, the highly modular structure
of the personal computer as it developed during the 1970s and 1980s (Langlois
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1992a) made it possible for Michael Dell and others to begin selling PCs to order
by assembling them like Legos from a set of standardized components (Kraemer
and Dedrick 2001). In so doing, PC makers could blanket more fully what
economists call the product space (Langlois and Robertson 1992), that is, they
could fine tune products more closely to the needs of individual users. When
economies of scale no longer require largely identical products to be
manufactured en masse on spec, a major source of environmental uncertainty
disappears, and with it the need to buffer that uncertainty.35
When a modular product is imbedded in a decentralized production
network, benefits also appear on the supply side36 (Langlois and Robertson
1992). For one thing, a modular system opens the technology up to a much
wider set of capabilities. Rather than being limited to the internal capabilities of
even the most capable Chandlerian corporation, a modular system can benefit
from the external capabilities of the entire economy. External capabilities are an
important aspect of the “extent of the market,” which encompasses not only the
number of possible traders but also the cumulative skill, experience, and
technology available to participants in the market. Moreover, because it can

35

Lamoreaux, Raff, and Temin (2002) make a similar point from the demand side. As incomes
rose in the U. S. after World War II, consumers became less satisfied with undifferentiated
products, creating a disadvantage for the large Chandlerian firm and an advantage for
smaller, more flexible units.

36

The supply-side aspect of modular standards have gone largely unnoticed in the economics
literature, which has focused almost exclusively on the possibilities of demand-side network
effects.
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generate economies of substitution (Garud and Kumaraswamy 1995) or external
economies of scope (Langlois and Robertson 1995), a modular system is not limited
by the weakest link in the chain of corporate capabilities but can avail itself of the
best modules the wider market has to offer. Moreover, an open modular system
can spur innovation, since, in allowing many more entry points for new ideas, it
can create what Nelson and Winter (1977) call rapid trial-and-error learning.37
From the perspective of the present argument, however, the crucial supply side
benefit of a modular production network is that it provides an additional
mechanism of buffering.
Social institutions, including standards, can support specialization and
exchange in other ways. When we think of markets becoming “thicker,” we
think of more traders for existing commodities. But liquidity is also a matter of
having markets in the first place. To put it another way, the development of
markets is often and importantly about the creation of new tradable units.
Sometimes these are “new products” in a conventional sense: the hula hoop or
beanie babies. But often the new products around which markets develop are
pieces of some larger system that become standardized and get broken off for
arms’-length trade. For example, markets for spare parts blossomed in the 1920s

37

Baldwin and Clark (2000) have recently explicated this last point in the language of finance
theory. If we think of each experiment taking place in the system as a real option, then an
open modular system can create more value than a closed corporation even if the same
number of experiments takes place in each system. This is a consequence of the theorem in
finance that says that a portfolio of options (the modular system) is worth more than an
option on a portfolio (the experiments within the corporation).
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as the aging of the automobile fleet encouraged a multitude of third-party
manufacturers (Langlois and Robertson 1989, p. 369). At a deeper level, what
made this possible was the standardization of the automobile into a “dominant
design,” thereby reducing qualitative variation in the list of parts. Even though
designs and parts change from year to year, a fleet of cars once on the road is
effectively a modular system, many of whose modules are standard enough to
trade on markets.
Consider a more recent example (Jacobides 2002).

Traditionally, the

stages of home mortgage lending – originating, underwriting, holding, and
servicing the loan – were integrated within banks and savings-and-loan
associations. Vertical control allowed bankers to buffer the default and other
risks in the face of asymmetric information and potential moral hazard. In the
1970s,

however,

the

government-sponsored

Federal

National

Mortgage

Association (Fannie-Mae) created, for reasons of its own, a mortgage portfolio
security that could be traded on financial markets. Originally, the full faith and
credit of the U. S. government helped solve the resultant agency problems; but
soon standards emerged for quality sorting, and the use of markets spread to
other quasi-governmental corporations and then to fully private financial firms.
Now the various stages of the mortgage process are typically undertaken by
different organizations.
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Although modularity in a deep sense lies behind all decentralization
(Langlois 2002), I don’t want to be understood as saying that the Chandlerian
corporation is giving way to pure modular systems and anonymous arms’-length
markets.

In many cases, the visible hand has indeed been socialized into

technical standards38 that permit external mechanisms of coordination and
reduce the need for rich information transfer. In many other cases, however,
products will continue to maintain significant “integrality,” and relationships
between stages will often be collaborative ones involving trust, permanence, and
the transfer of rich information (Helper, MacDuffie, and Sabel 2000). Although
the personal computer is the epitome of a modular system, market leader Dell
exercises considerable administrative control over stages of production it does
not own – effectively creating through the market the kind of tightly integrated
logistics system Swift had created through a Chandlerian corporation (Fields
2003). As a central tendency, however, the buffering functions of management
are devolving to the mechanisms of modularity and the market — informational
decomposition, flexibility, and risk spreading.

Transaction costs and the new economy.
The reader may have noticed that the Internet and other present-day
technologies of coordination have played at best a supporting role in my story
rather than a starring role. This is somewhat in contrast to the billing technology

38

I am indebted to Martin Kenney for this phrase.
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has received in other venues. In the year 2000, The New York Times offered up
Ronald Coase as the indisputable if improbable guru of Internet economics
(Tedeschi 2000). In his famous 1937 paper, Coase had argued that transaction
costs drive the make-or-buy decision; thus, since the Internet has reduced
transaction costs, Coase had effectively predicted a principal feature of the new
economy: the increasing devolution of transactions from firms to markets. Of
course, what Coase actually said is that the scope of the firm is determined in
Marshallian fashion at the margin: the firm will expand (in terms of number of
activities internalized) until the costs of internalizing one more transaction just
balance the costs of an equivalent transaction on the market. And, as Hal Varian
reminds us in a more recent New York Times article (Varian 2002), the effects on
market structure of information-improving innovation are thus ambiguous: they
depend on whether the innovation reduces the costs of organizing internally
more than it reduces the costs of organizing on markets. Just remember, says
Varian, the railroad and the telegraph gave us the large vertically integrated
firms of the Nineteenth Century.
Malone and Laubacher (1998, p. 147) take this point one step further.
Until recently, they contend, virtually all improvements in the technology of
coordination favored internal organization. “The coordination technologies of
the industrial era — the train and the telegraph, the automobile and the
telephone, the mainframe computer — made internal transactions not only

- 51 -

possible but advantageous.” It is only with the very recent development of even
more powerful coordination technology — personal computers and broadband
communication networks — that markets have been favored.

“Because

information can be shared instantly and inexpensively among many people in
many locations, the value of centralized decision making and expensive
bureaucracies decreases” (p. 147).
This may well be part of the story. But the hypothesis I offer here is a bit
more subtle, or at least a bit more complicated, and arguably more general. In
my view, the phenomenon of the vanishing hand is a further continuation of the
Smithian process of the division of labor on which Chandler’s managerial
revolution was a way station.39 Thus the vanishing hand is driven not just by
changes in coordination technology but also by changes in the extent of markets
— by increasing population and income, but also by the globalization of markets.
Reductions of political barriers to trade around the world are having an effect
analogous to the reduction of technological barriers to trade in the America of
the nineteenth century (Findlay and O’Rourke 2002). Is this a revolution or the
continuation of a long-standing trend? Again, the answer depends on one’s
perspective. My argument is that, just as the American “globalization” after the
Civil War was revolutionary in its systemic reorganization of production toward

39

Note that Smith’s theory is not a historicist prediction but rather a contingent causal theory:
the division of labor is casued or enabled by the extent of the market, all other things equal.
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standardization and volume, the new era is revolutionary in its systematic deverticalization in response both to changes in coordination technology and to
plain-old increases in the extent of markets.
Indeed, it is not clear that we are entitled to see coordination technology
as an entirely exogenous influence on organization form. Perhaps we might
grant the deployment of the telegraph as an exogenous event that helped to
integrate markets and thus helped bring about the managerial revolution. But
when we think of much of the rest of the technology employed by managerial
organizations — from filing cabinets to carbon paper to typewriters to
mimeograph machines (Yates 2000) — we might more usefully think in terms of
the coevolution of technology and organization.

Physical and social

technologies40 influence one another by each throwing up problems the other is
challenged to solve.

On the one hand, this reinforces the notion that an

organizational structure biases technological change in ways that reinforce that
structure. On the other hand, it reduces the extent to which we can view such
technological change as independently causative. Was the Internet an exogenous
event like the telegraph that altered organizational form decisively? Perhaps.
But it is well to remember that, back when the currency of the digital world was
dots and dashes rather than zeroes and ones, the international hub of e-

This is a potentially reversible process, as when specialization in Europe declined after the
fall of the Roman Empire.

- 53 -

commerce was Manchester, England, where the telegraph served as a vibrant
element in one of history’s most vertically disintegrated production systems – the
British cotton textile industry (Farnie 1979, p. 64). In my view, the relationship
among coordination technology, transaction costs, and industrial structure
remains an open research agenda.
Figure 1 summarizes the vanishing-hand thesis in visual form. I have
called the independent variable “thickness of markets,” which is driven by

Urgency of buffering.

Visible hand

Vanishing hand
1990
1880

Invisible hand
Thickness of markets
Figure1: the vanishing-hand hypothesis.

40

To use the language of Nelson and Sampat (2001). Their point is that institutions – including
generic organizational forms – evolve in much the same way that technology does.
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exogenous factors like population, income, and the height of technological and
political trade barriers. The vertical axis is called “urgency of buffering,” by
which I mean to capture the degree to which the technology of production is
complex, sequential, and high-throughput. Producing cotton cloth under the
putting out system would have a low degree of urgency of buffering; producing
electricity for the state of California would have a high degree of urgency of
buffering. The straight line moving northeast from the vertical axis represents
the boundary between firm and market.

Above the line, buffering through

integration and management is less costly; below the line, buffering through
markets (of a thickness given on the horizontal axis) is preferable. That the line
slopes upward simply reflects the increased ability of markets to buffer productflow uncertainty as they thicken.
The more-or-less parabolic curve superimposed on this space represents
the vanishing-hand hypothesis. Think of it as a path in time, rather like the plot
of an explorer’s progress on a map.41

The possibilities for high-throughput

technologies and mass production made possible in the late nineteenth century
generated a rapid and sudden increase in the urgency of buffering. This is
reflected in the initially steep slope of the curve: markets were insufficiently thick
to

buffer

product-flow

uncertainty,

just

as

they

were

initially

too

underdeveloped to handle financial risk. Over time, two things happen: (a)
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markets get thicker and (b) the urgency of buffering levels off and then begins to
decline. In part, urgency of buffering declines because technological change
begins to lower the minimum efficient scale of production. But it also declines
because improvements in coordination technology — whether applied within a
firm or across firms — lower the cost (and therefore the urgency) of buffering.
More or less arbitrarily, I have labeled as 1880 the point at which the path
crosses the firm-market boundary.

This is the start of the Chandlerian

revolution. Equally arbitrarily, I label as 1990 the point at which the path crosses
back. This is the vanishing hand. Far from being a general historical trend, the
managerial revolution — in this interpretation — is a temporary episode that
arose in a particular era as the result of uneven development in the Smithian
process of the division of labor.

41

The technically inclined may want to view it as the projection onto two dimensions of a
curve in three-dimensional space, with the third (z) dimension being time.
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